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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, October 31, 1980
Page 19
battling back and forth across the SWA-Angola border for years.
The
war has steadily escalated, with an estimated 15,000 South African troops
now in SWA, many stationed in the border area.
A high-level U.N. delegation was in Pretoria last week, but returned to
New York empty-handed. U.N. officials claim they have met South African
Foreign Minister Roelef ("Pik") Botha's earlier objections tc their
cease-fire proposals--withdrawal of South African and SWAPO forces to
predesignated bases or areas, a demilitarized zone at the border and
U.N.-supervised elections. However, South African officials state they
still have a need for reassurance of U.N. impartiality--and with 000d
reason. The U.N. has not gone back on its long-held endorsement of SWAPO
as the "sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people."
It is doubtful that a U.N. police force would act impartially, since
South Africa is the U.N. 's favorite whipping boy.
It is also doubtful
that U.N. forces could adequately police the long border, or keep SWAPO
guerrillas confined to their bases. Above all, Pretoria feels that SWAPO
squads would be left free to intimidate voters into voting their way, in
much the same manner that Robert Mugabe's soldiers did in Zimbabwe.
SWAPO's power and influence is said to have grown a lot over the last
two years. Experts predict a SWAPO victory at the polls, intimidation or
not. Thus Pretoria is faced with the prospect of yet another "liberated
country" along its borders. This places South African Prime Minister
Pieter Botha in a dilemma. An election victory by SWAPO leader Sam
Nunoma, who admits to being a "white hater," could arouse white fears
inside South Africa itself and call a halt to Botha's internal reform
plans.
If South Africa does not finally agree to the independence timetable,
there will be calls within the U.N. General Assembly, especially from
Nigeria, to have the Security Council levy selective economic sanctions
against South Africa itself, at the very least a call for the end to
further investments in the country. Such calls have been heard before,
but have never gotten anywhere because of the certainty of a veto in the
Security Council by one or more of the Western "Big Five" nations--the
U.S., Canada, Britain, France and West Germany--all major trading powers
with South Africa.
This time there is less likelihood of a veto, since the "Big Five" have
been doing most of the negotiating for the U.N. with Pretoria. Also,
Nigeria, a growing oil power and major supplier to both the U.S. and
Britain, is prepared to use its considerable leverage (threat of an oil
cutoff) to assure there will be no veto.
(Pretoria, if it can be accused
of stalling on the issue, at least wanted to postpone any U.N. action
until after the West German and U.S. elections. The South Africans were
counting on victories by Franz Josef Strauss and Ronald Reagan to hope
fully shore up faltering support in the U.N. They still have some hope
with regard to Mrs. Thatcher's government.)
Sanctions, if enacted (and adhered to) will hurt the Western industri
alized world considerably, especially if they go beyond merely a call for
a hal� to investments (or even disinvestments) to an actual trade boycott.
Many African nations whose trade and transportation lifelines go out
through South Africa would be damaged even more--which is probably the
only reason why sanctions might be of a limited nature at first.