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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, March 20, 1981
Page 17
datory sanctions" against Pretoria. The General Assembly not only did
not repudiate the 1973 pro-SWAPO resolution, but reaffirmed it by a 114-0
vote (with 22 abstentions). Thus, positions on both sides have consider
ably hardened.
Troubles have escalated as well between South Africa and Mozambique. The
latter country acts as host to bases of the Soviet-backed African National
Congress (ANC), the principal guerrilla threat to the Republic. On Janu
ary 29, three ANC command posts located in the vicinity of Maputo, Mozam
bique's capital, were attacked and destroyed in a daring raid by elements
of the South African Defense Forces (SADF). Intelligence evidence had
shown that attacks against South African police stations, the oil-from-coal
"SASOL" project and the attack against a bank in Silverton had been
launched from Maputo with assistance from the PLO, as well as help from
Cuban and East German advisors. In other words, the same Moscow-based
international terrorist network that Secretary of State Alexander Haig
has been inveighing against.
Shortly after the attack, Soviet warships entered the Mozambiquan ports
of Maputo and Beira as a show of support for the pro-Soviet government of
President Samora Machel--a veiled warning by Moscow to Pretoria not to
carry out further hot pursuit actions.
The rai6s into Angola and Mozambique ordered by South African's Prime
Minister P.W. Botha are not without their political overtones. Mr. Botha
is up for reelection in April. There is no doubt he will win. The ques
tion is by how much. The Prime Minister is very concerned by growing
ultra-conservative criticism from both within his own party and without,
over his social reform program. Many feel his hard-line approach toward
the terrorists was partly intended to calm fears that he was becoming soft.
Pretoria feels it has a freer hand to deal with its problems now that the
Reagan Administration is in office in Washington. While Secretary of
State Haig stresses that the Administration has not yet formulated its
Southern Africa policy, the belief is that Washington would resort to the
veto in the UN Security Council to prevent sanctions from being imposed
on South Africa over the SWA dispute.
At least the Reagan Administration, pursuing a more "realistic" policy
in world affairs (180 degrees opposite from that of the Carter Adminis
tration) is aware of the strategic minerals issue, of which Southern
Africa is a key element.
For this reason also, the Reagan people are advocating a much stronger
policy toward acquiring strategic mineral stockpiles. This is the main
reason, too, why Washington put the Kibosh on the "Law of the Sea" con
ference which was nearing the end of seven years of work. The confer
ence's final recommendations were decidedly anti-Western. Third World
nations wanted to create a UN authority to control access to the mineral
deposits on the ocean floors. Such an agency would, in effect, have
stifled exploration, preserving markets for traditional minerals suppliers.
--Gene Hogberg, News Bureau