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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, MARCH 16, 1984
PAGE 13
in the later stages of the war, Britain persuaded the Americans
to move a military satellite from its Soviet-watching orbit over
tne nortnern hemisphere to co�the Falklands area. This move,
using the satellite's scarce fuel and thus shortening its life,
did not please those in the Pentagon who already felt the Falk
lands was a dangerous distraction.... The Americans claim "98%"
of British intelligence of Argentine movements came from them.
The British prefer not to comment.... The [ Britisfi"Tcabinet
decision to sink the Argentine cruiser, Bel � rano, was probably
communicated to the British nuclear submarine, HMS Conqueror,
over an American military satellite link.
This American assistance was partly the result of long-standing,
close liaison between British and American military missions, but
it depended heavily on the direct personal commitment of Mr.
Weinberger himself•... Hence perhaps Mr. Weinberger's most
remarkable offer of the war: to fill the most glaring gap which
would open up in Admiral Woodward• s armoury should anything
happen to either of his carriers, Hermes and Invincible. It was
proposed that an amphibious assault ship of about the same size,
USS Guam, with capacity to handle helicopters and Harriers, would
sfiiiply be turned over to the Royal Navy. Given the political
explosion this would have caused both in Latin America and from
the war's opponents in Washington, the ship would have had to be
staffed entirely by British sailors, only a handful of whom would
have seen such a ship, a risky and bizarre idea. The Pentagon
dared not commit a single engineer to the war--though it might
have done so in the last resort. Fortunately, Britain qid not
have to take up the offer.
In the light of the Falklands rescue operation, one can easily comprehend
American anger when Britain, a year-and-a-half later, refused to support
the American intervention in Grenada. In fact, London joined in the world
wide chorus of condemnation. Analyzed THE ECONOMIST in its following issue
(March 10):
America's bitterness over Britain's opposition was and remains
deep.
Subsequent revelations of Cuban and RussTan Tiivolvement
seemed to make no difference to Britain's stance. To the White
House this was precisely the sort of confrontation with communism
on which it expected Mrs. Thatcher's support. As in the Falk
lands, democracy was intervening to counter lawlessness....
President Reagan had supported Britain, unconsulted, in the South
Atlantic. Why could Mrs. Thatcher not give him the benefit of
the doubt in Grenada?
The Falklands-Grenada episodes add more fuel to the transatlantic feud, now
even threatening to divide the two Anglo-Saxon powers.
--Gene H. Hogberg, News Bureau