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PASTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, April 10, 1981
Page 15
Thus, Moscow is confronted with one of its most serious and confusing
dilemmas ever. Poland represents a gross contradiction in Communist terms
--a situation in which the "government of the workers" (the communist
Polish United Workers' Party) is being challenged by 10 millions of the
country's workers (Solidarity). Even more absurd in Moscow's eyes is the
fact that one-third of the Communist party members are also members of
Solidarity.
Some Western diplomats in Moscow feel that the Soviets missed their best
chance months ago to get the upper hand in Poland. The reform movement
has since swept by them and now enjoys widespread support among Poland's
intellectuals, industrial workers, farmers and church leaders. Intellec
tual dissidents such as those representing the Committee for Social Self
Defense (KOR) denounce Marxist ideology in public. Moscow is frustrated
because it has decreasing opportunities in which to communicate its
message to the Polish people since the Polish communist party has lost
almost complete control over Poland's newspapers.
Poland's situation is far different from what Moscow confronted in Czecho
slovakia during the "Prague Spring" of 1968. The Czech reform movement
(which called for "communism with a human face") was led by a reform-
minded Conununist party. The Czech people followed their new leaders,
intoxicated by the increasingly liberalized political climate. Then,
suddenly, Moscow slanuned the door shut.
In Poland, almost the reverse is true. The reform movement there is
essentially "grass roots" in nature, with the Polish people themselves
putting the pressure on the reluctant party and government, forcing one
concession after another. Poland's conununist party retains the power-
but has lost authority over the people to Solidarity.
Meanwhile, what influence does the Polish pope, John Paul II, have over
events in his homeland? Little has been revealed directly. However, it
is now believed that the Soviet Union came very close to intervening in
Poland last December. According to one report, Mr. Brezhnev cast the
deciding vote in a 7-6 Politburo decision not to send in the troops.
Newsweek magazine, in its January 5, 1981 issue speculated that there
may have been another reason for the Kremlin's caution during the earlier
December crisis. It said, in its "Periscope" column of that date:
"Pope John Paul has quietly passed word that he would fly to Poland to
be with his countrymen if the Soviets invade. He disclosed this in off
the-record audiences with at least two recent visitors, both of whom came
away with the impression that the pope has made his intentions known to
the Soviets. One of the visitors, a French diplomat, thinks the prospect
of John Paul's presence could help account for the Kremlin's caution in
the Polish situation so far."
A Vatican spokesman was quick to deny that the Pope had ever voiced such
an intention.
Vatican pressure or not, the men in Moscow are undoubtedly thinking long
and hard about the expected costs of direct intervention in the affairs
of their socialist ally. Another indication of why they may not move
at this time was given this morning: Intelligence reports reveal that
Moscow has had to beef up its forces in Afghanistan to the tune of another
25,000 to 30,000 men.
--Gene H. Hogberg, News Bureau